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Abstract 
 This dissertation consists of two essays. First essay investigates Fortune 500 companies 
that implemented Six Sigma. Since the 1980s, industrial organizations have adopted practices 
such as Six Sigma to maintain and enhance competitiveness. The purpose of this study is to look 
at the long run stock price and the operating performance of Fortune 500 companies that were 
identified to have implemented Six Sigma compared to the overall market performance as well 
as the performance of industry and size matched firms. Even though our sample firms improved 
several variables after implementing Six Sigma, their operating performances were not quite 
close to the performances of the matching firms. After implementing Six Sigma, compared to the 
industry and size matched firms, the only variable that improved out of 14 variables we looked 
at, is the growth in staff levels. The findings may contribute to understanding the reasons that 
underlie the so-called jobless recovery. 
 Second essay investigates the real estate price indices in 19 emerging markets. The main 
objectives of the central banks are not necessarily in line with the goals for asset prices, 
particularly house prices; however house price changes can have important implications for 
economic activity and inflation. The consequences of excess changes in house prices also should 
be watched carefully by central banks and other government agencies that regulate financial 
institutions for the purpose of financial stability. This essay searches for a link between house 
prices, broad money, private credit and the macro-economy among 19 emerging markets. We are 
also trying to explain which variables predict the emerging markets real estate index returns. Our 
results show that money market rate, growth in GDP and CPI as well as log of private credit and 
money supply have significant predictive power on growth in real estate price indices a quarter 
ahead. We also show that there is multidirectional causality among all of the variables. A unique 
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data is being used for the emerging markets real estate price indexes in this study. The data is 
provided by a Dubai based private company which offers emerging markets real estate 
information to its customers. 
 
Key Word: Six Sigma, Fortune 500, Abnormal Returns, Operating Performance, Growth in Staff, 
Real Estate, Emerging Markets, Broad Money, Private Credit, Causality.  
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Chapter 1 
Six Sigma, Stock Returns and Operating Performance 
Managers are increasingly held accountable for delivering maximum shareholder value 
while also providing improved relationships with stakeholders, particularly customers.  Since the 
1980s, industrial organizations have adopted practices such as Six Sigma to maintain and 
enhance competitiveness.  At once, the goals of these systematic programs are greater 
satisfaction of customer needs and requirements as well as upgraded efficiency through lower 
costs and enriched product quality.  Realization of these goals would lead to larger profits and 
higher shareholder wealth. 
A major problem in most public corporations is the conflict of interest caused by the 
separation of ownership and control, which is an “agency problem”. These agency problems lead 
to frictions that reduce the value created by the corporation for its various stakeholders. The 
conceptual idea of a Total Quality Management (TQM) philosophy is an extension of this 
insight, actually. It is argued that “…agency frictions related to poor leadership, worker 
alienation, and diminished morale account for the majority of productivity losses within 
organizations. Moreover, most failures in organizations are caused by systemic flaws rather than 
individual errors. Such flaws prevent companies from achieving levels of quality, or 
productivity, that they might otherwise be capable of achieving.” (See W. Edwards Deming, The 
New Economics, MIT Press, 1990.) Bacidore et al. (2005) discuss that “…TQM has 
demonstrated that it has the potential to alter attitudes and behavior, improve motivation, and 
reduce agency costs by eliciting the best efforts from all organizational stakeholders. These best 
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efforts can eliminate waste and enhance productivity significantly. ... The enhancement of 
productivity from an effective TQM program should lead to lower costs, higher quality, and 
increased market share, all of which ultimately result in greater shareholder wealth.” 
In this paper, we also argue that Six Sigma may represent an attempt to communicate 
about desirable organizational attributes to parties that cannot observe them directly. We argue 
that Six Sigma may be an instrument to Managers for signaling quality to their customers. 
Currently, one of the most popular quality programs is Six Sigma. The Six Sigma 
approach, formulated by Motorola in the 1980s, is primarily a methodology for improving the 
capability of business processes by using statistical methods to identify and decrease or eliminate 
process variation. Its goal is reduction of defects and improvements in profits, employee morale 
and product quality.  
Motorola formulated Six Sigma in the 1980’s. The result was a total transformation of the 
company by higher quality and lower costs. These results leaded Motorola to win the Malcolm 
Baldrige National Quality Award in 1988 which brought great attention to Six Sigma among 
major companies.  
Six Sigma is simply an implementation of quality principles and methods at achieving 
almost error-free business performance. Six Sigma capability is achieving merely 3.4 defects per 
million outcomes. This process management goes beyond the oversight of the regular business 
procedures to understanding business processes and flows of work. This understanding relies 
heavily on documenting from the beginning to the end, from inputs to process activities and to 
output. Customer expectations are clearly defined and updated on a regular basis. Therefore 
actions are taken to address the problems and opportunities.  
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One important feature of Six Sigma is creating a structure to make sure that all the 
necessary resources are provided to the performance improvement procedures. Before Six 
Sigma, quality assurance was largely assigned to management on the production floor and to 
some other technical people in a separate quality department. Six Sigma makes quality 
improvement the job of a small but critical number of people who institutionalize change. This 
infrastructure begins with the CEO and other top managers. Therefore Six Sigma is a top-down 
implementation. Six Sigma creates a separate hierarchy in this structure, from Master Black Belt 
to Black Belt and then to Green Belt. Master Black Belts provide leadership. Black Belts oversee 
and support Green Belts and other improvement teams. Green Belt certification is usually 
required. This certification may be obtained within the company itself or from outside providers 
such as Villanova University which offers online certification courses. (Davis 2013)  
Six Sigma project contains a five-step methodology called DMAIC. The first step is to 
“define” the opportunity. This includes collecting any background information about the process 
and defining the most important aspects for the customer. The next step is “measuring” the 
process performance or collecting relevant data according to the parameters defined in step one. 
Once the data is collected it can then be analyzed using statistical tools. The third step is 
“Analyze” where the data is analyzed to determine gaps between the existing process and the 
performance goals. The fourth step is to “improve” the solutions that were found after analyzing 
the data. Finally the last step “controls” as a final check for the improvements that have been 
implemented. 
Quality is not obviously limited to manufacturers. Started at manufacturing companies, 
Six Sigma, soon expanded to service and other industries. Hotels such as Ritz-Carlton are 
examples. Quality is not even limited to businesses. Cities such as Madison, Wisconsin, and 
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counties such as Erie County, Pennsylvania, have been practicing quality methods. Under the 
leadership of Admiral Frank B. Kelso, Chief of Naval Operations from 1990 to 1994, the U.S. 
Navy committed to the practice of these same quality methods in it Total Quality Leadership 
program. More recently, the U.S. Army Material Command has committed to “Lean Six Sigma”. 
Which combines elements of lean manufacturing and Six Sigma. Morever, in 2007, the U.S. 
Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) won the Malcolm 
Baldridge National Quality Award in the nonprofit category. (Davis, 2013)   
Employee involvement is job training with focus on skills and knowledge to perform the 
job. Companies that are committed to quality usually spend more than before on employee 
training. In 1997, Citibank hired Motorola University Consulting and Training Services to teach 
Six Sigma procedures to its employees. Citibank began its quality training initiative in 1997. 
From May 1997 to October 1997, more than 650 senior managers were trained. Between 
November 1997 and the end of 1998, another 7,500 employees attended sessions. By early 1999, 
92,000 employees worldwide had been trained. Between 1996 and 1998, General Electric has 
spent $1 billion on Six Sigma procedures. Since then thousands of companies world-wide started 
implementing Six Sigma.  
I. Motivation and Data 
Over the past 20 years, use of Six Sigma has saved Fortune 500 companies an estimated 
$427 billion, according to research published in the January/February 2007 issue of iSixSigma 
Magazine. However, an increasing number of articles such as those in Fortune, The Wall St 
Journal and Fast Company suggest that Six Sigma companies are failing. The market 
performance of many companies like 3M, Ford, General Electric, Motorola, Delphi, Home 
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Depot, Larson, Eastman Kodak, and Xerox has fallen dramatically, and great number of Six 
Sigma companies has trailed the S&P 500 since adopting Six Sigma. 
The purpose of this study is to look at the long run stock price and the operating 
performance of Fortune 500 companies that implemented Six Sigma process compared to the 
overall market performance as well as the similar firms within their industries. We are using 
2006 Fortune 500 companies so that we can compare up to 5 year after performance of these 
companies. Companies usually implement Six Sigma at different levels; (1) Corporate, (2) 
Business Unit, (3) Pilot and (4) Belt. (1) Corporate: Enterprise-wide initiative with corporate-
level executive support. (2) Business unit: Business unit deployment, supported by a corporate 
executive and/or business unit general manager. (3) Pilot: Organized and supported pilot 
initiative in one or more business units. The company is testing the water. (4) Belt: Unorganized 
Black Belts and/or Green Belts. These may or may not be supported by executive or local 
management. In 2006, 108 companies in the Fortune 500 were identified, with the initial start 
date, as they had implemented Six Sigma. Of these 108 companies, eighty-five had implemented 
Six Sigma at the corporate level, fourteen at the business unit level, four at the pilot level, and 
five at the belt level. 
II. Literature Review 
Stock price reactions to the announcement of quality activities such as Malcolm Baldrige 
National Quality Awards have been studied by Ramasesh (1998) and Przasnyski and Tai (1999). 
Easton and Jarrell (1998) looks at the effects of TQM on corporate performance. Ramesesh 
reports that the stock price movements around the day of the announcement increase the 
shareholder wealth. Przasnyski and Tai show mixing results therefore recommend further 
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research. Easton and Jarrell, on the other hand, report long-term performance improvement of 
firms that implemented TQM.  
 The impact of ISO 9000 certification on the performance of stock prices has been 
analyzed by Docking and Dowen (1999) and Corbett, Montes-Sancho and Kirsh (2005). Long 
run stock price performance was also analyzed by Ferreira, Sinha and Varble (2007). Docking 
and Dowen show that for the smallest firms, ISO 9000 registration is regarded as positive 
information by investors. Corbett, Montes-Sancho and Kirsh show that three years after 
certification, the certified firms display significant abnormal returns. Ferreira, Sinha and Varble’s 
results show that only stocks of large-size firms experience positive abnormal returns, whereas 
stocks of mid-size firms experience negative average abnormal returns. Their results are not 
consistent with the notion that companies that implement quality management system maybe 
reducing agency cost.  
Goh et al. (2003) investigated stock price reaction on the day when SixSigma activities 
were made known publicly, as well as the long-run stock performance of ‘Six Sigma companies’ 
(sample of 20 firms) and found no significant abnormal returns. 
Bacidore (1997) argue that Both TQM and EVA can be viewed as organizational 
innovations designed to reduce “agency costs”. Terlaak and King (2006) investigate ISO 9000 as 
a signaling approach. Their hypothesis is that certification may provide a way of communicating 
about unobservable firm attributes, thereby generating a growth effect for certified organizations. 
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III. Long run stock returns to investors in Six Sigma firms 
A. Design 
The long run stock performance of the sample firms are examined by analyzing three 
different mean returns; market-adjusted returns, buy and hold returns and unadjusted returns of 
the firms that implemented Six Sigma as well as the industry and size matched firms. The 
hypothesis is that Six Sigma process would make the management of the firms to pursue process 
improvement and cost cutting programs that will enable the firms to generate higher returns for 
investors. 
The market-adjusted abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the 
individual firm’s returns and the returns of the benchmark index, S&P 500 and equally weighted 
market index. The abnormal returns are calculated using the event study methodology with 
monthly returns. Designating the month of December of the implementation year as t=0, we 
estimated the abnormal returns over the 8 years (96 months) surrounding t=0, -3 to +5 (-36 to 
+60). The market adjusted model: 
       
where ARit is the abnormal return of stock i month t, Rit is the return of stock i at month t, Rmt is 
the market return on month t. The mean abnormal return, AARt , on month t is then computed as: 
   
1

  


 
where N is the number of stocks with return information. We computed the cumulative abnormal 
return in [t1,T] as follows: 
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The mean cumulative abnormal return is computed then as: 
,   
1
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Then t-tests are conducted by dividing the abnormal returns by their contemporaneous cross-
sectional standard errors. 
The buy and hold returns are the returns realized for buying the shares and holding them 
for a period of -36, -24, -12, 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 months. Following Byun and Rozeff (2003), 
the buy and hold abnormal returns can be calculated as: 
  1  


  1  


  
where BHAR is the buy and hold abnormal returns, Ri is the returns for firm i, Rm is the returns 
on the market index and n is the end of the holding period. The abnormal returns for each month 
are obtained by taking the average across the sample. These returns are subsequently cumulated 
over different periods over the 3 years before and 5 years after the Six Sigma implementation. 
We conducted t-tests by dividing the abnormal returns by their contemporaneous cross-sectional 
standard errors. 
B. Results 
The abnormal returns using the two returns are shown on Table 1. The market adjusted 
returns for the firms that implemented Six Sigma and the industry and size matched firms are 
shown in Panel A while the buy and hold returns are shown in Panel B. Panel C presents the 
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unadjusted returns. The results show that Six Sigma firms outperform the market both before and 
after the Six Sigma implementation. We claim that managers use Six Sigma as a signal to 
investor to show that they are committed to continued improvement of their process and efficient 
use of the resources. Buy and hold abnormal returns are statistically significantly higher than the 
S&P 500 and equally weighted indexes after implementing Six Sigma, 7.48% in one year and up 
to cumulative return of 48.34% after five years. The abnormal returns become even more 
significant at 1% level two years after implementation. The positive effects of Six Sigma on 
abnormal returns start showing right after implementation, especially after three years. This may 
also be an indicator of reduced agency cost as Six Sigma becomes more and more part of the 
daily operations of companies.  
When we compare these returns to the industry and size matched firms, the abnormal 
returns are rather disappointing. Unadjusted mean cumulative abnormal returns from months -36 
to 0 of matching firms are 57.35% compared to 50.81% of Six Sigma firms with a difference of 
6.54%. The difference in return means keeps increasing each year which may indicate that the 
firms are actually under pressure to implement Six Sigma as total quality management.  Three 
years after implementing Six Sigma, they finally start closing the gap with the matching firms 
even though their abnormal returns are still lower even after five years. 
If we look at the percentage of firms achieving positive mean cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR), the number increases as years go buy. While only 59% of our sample firms 
achieved positive buy and hold CARs one year prior to implementing Six Sigma, 72% show 
positive buy and hold CARs 5 years after. 
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TABLE 1 
Long run abnormal returns             
Event 
Period 
  Six Sigma 
Firms   
 
Industry & Size Matched Firms 
 
Difference 
  Mean CAR % Positive  Mean CAR % Positive  Mean CAR 
Panel A: Market-adjusted returns 
 -36-0 
 
21.23 68% 
 
31.19 76% 
 
-9.96 
 
(3.205)*** 
 
(9.366)*** 
 
(-0.9407) 
-24-0 
 
13.09 64% 
 
22.68 75% 
 
-9.59 
 
(2.401)*** 
 
(9.255)*** 
 
(-1.1674) 
-12-0 
 
6.42 62% 
 
10.60 70% 
 
-4.18 
 
(1.999)** 
 
(7.147)*** 
 
(-0.6208) 
0-12 
 
9.36 70% 
 
12.74 73% 
 
-3.38 
 
(3.608)*** 
 
(8.478)*** 
 
(-0.6506) 
0-24 
 
19.65 76% 
 
25.35 83% 
 
-5.70 
 
(4.814)*** 
 
(11.917)*** 
 
(-1.0602) 
0-36 
 
26.79 74% 
 
29.18 81% 
 
-2.39 
 
(4.412)*** 
 
(11.141)*** 
 
(-0.4902) 
0-48 
 
38.98 82% 
 
29.64 76% 
 
9.34 
 
(6.021)*** 
 
(9.588)*** 
 
(0.9419) 
0-60 
 
46.86 82% 
 
35.61 79% 
 
11.25 
 
(6.021)*** 
 
(10.475)*** 
 
(-0.8140) 
 Panel B: Buy and hold returns 
 -36-0 
 
22.00 58% 
 
39.54 68% 
 
-17.54 
 
(1.194) 
 
(6.529)*** 
 
(-0.9407) 
-24-0 
 
15.24 55% 
 
29.94 70% 
 
-14.70 
 
(0.591) 
 
(7.480)*** 
 
(-1.1674) 
-12-0 
 
8.53 59% 
 
12.39 66% 
 
-3.86 
 
(1.395)* 
 
(5.816)*** 
 
(-0.6208) 
0-12 
 
7.48 65% 
 
13.73 70% 
 
-6.25 
 
(2.602)** 
 
(7.147)*** 
 
(-0.6506) 
0-24 
 
15.89 69% 
 
30.91 80% 
 
-15.02 
 
(3.406)*** 
 
(10.808)*** 
 
(-1.0602) 
0-36 
 
24.24 67% 
 
36.51 74% 
 
-12.27 
 
(3.004)*** 
 
(8.922)*** 
 
(-0.4902) 
0-48 
 
40.23 72% 
 
37.64 69% 
 
2.59 
 
(4.010)*** 
 
(6.925)*** 
 
(0.9419) 
0-60 
 
48.34 72% 
 
51.53 69% 
 
-3.19 
 
(4.010)*** 
 
(7.036)*** 
 
(0.8140) 
 
 
11 
 
TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Panel C: Unadjusted returns 
 -36-0 
 
50.81 74% 
 
57.35 77% 
 
-6.54 
 
(3.324)*** 
 
(8.218)*** 
 
(-0.1669) 
-24-0 
 
30.09 69% 
 
41.59 77% 
 
-11.50 
 
(2.308)** 
 
(7.995)*** 
 
(-0.5680) 
-12-0 
 
14.09 68% 
 
21.02 75% 
 
-6.93 
 
(2.105)** 
 
(7.549)*** 
 
(-0.6068) 
0-12 
 
11.75 60% 
 
19.12 77% 
 
-7.37 
 
-0.48 
 
(8.106)*** 
 
(-0.4552) 
0-24 
 
26.95 75% 
 
41.88 78% 
 
-14.93 
 
(3.527)*** 
 
(8.329)*** 
 
(-0.4773) 
0-36 
 
35.42 73% 
 
52.87 76% 
 
-17.45 
 
(3.121)*** 
 
(7.772)*** 
 
(-0.5719) 
0-48 
 
52.41 74% 
 
56.75 73% 
 
-4.34 
 
(3.324)*** 
 
(6.770)*** 
 
(0.1151) 
0-60 
 
66.23 72% 
 
70.53 75% 
 
-4.30 
 
(2.917)*** 
 
(7.438)*** 
 
(0.3417) 
                  
This table shows the mean cumulative abnormal returns for the Six Sigma firms as well as Industry 
and Size matched firms. The returns are market adjusted mean cumulative abnormal returns, buy 
and hold returns (BHAR) and unadjusted returns. The returns are from -36 to month 60. The figures 
in parentheses are t-statistics and the symbols ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively. 
 
In summary, even though firms that implement Six Sigma outperform the market as well 
as the S&P 500 index, their performance is not up to par with the firms in the same industry 
which are close to their size. It looks like there is a big competition within their respective 
industries which puts the management under pressure.  
IV. Operating performance changes after Six Sigma  
We examine the pre- and post- Six Sigma operating performances of the subject firms 
relative to that of the industry and size matched firms using five different of criteria; Liquidity 
12 
 
Analysis, Activity Analysis, Management Efficiency, Earnings Ability and Labor. We analyzed 
14 ratios grouped under these five criteria. Details of the ratios are listed in Appendix A. 
A. Liquidity analysis 
Current ratio is a liquidity ratio that measures a company’s ability to pay short term 
obligations. The higher the current ratio, the more capable the company is of paying its 
obligations. A ratio under 1 suggests that the company would be unable to pay off its obligations 
if they came due at that point. The quick ratio measures a company's ability to meet its short-
term obligations with its most liquid assets. The higher the quick ratio, the better the position of 
the company. Net working capital is a measure of both a company's efficiency and its short-term 
financial health. 
B. Activity analysis 
Activity analysis ratios are calculated to measure the efficiency with which the resources 
of a firm have been employed. Asset turnover ratio measures a firm's efficiency at using its 
assets in generating sales or revenue - the higher the number the better. Accounts receivable 
turnover ratio is used to quantify a firm's effectiveness in extending credit as well as collecting 
debts. The accounts receivable turnover ratio is an activity ratio, measuring how efficiently a 
firm uses its assets. Inventory turnover ratio is a ratio showing how many times a company's 
inventory is sold and replaced over a period. High inventory levels are unhealthy because they 
represent an investment with a rate of return of zero. It also opens the company up to trouble 
should prices begin to fall. Since Six Sigma is a process improvement, it is expected to improve 
these ratios. 
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C. Management efficiency 
We employed operating efficiency measures such as cost-to-income ratio and expense-to-
asset ratio as proxies for management efficiency. Lower ratios reflect higher management 
efficiency. It is expected that because of greater emphasis on process improvement, the Six 
Sigma firms would be more efficient than they were prior to the implementation of Six Sigma. 
D. Earnings ability (profitability) 
Six Sigma is expected to cut costs and improve defects. Therefore, we expect the 
profitability of the Six Sigma firms to increase following their implementation of Six Sigma. We 
use gross profit margin and return on assets (ROA) as measures of profitability. However, there 
are several arguments that ROA is biased upwards. Consequently, we also employed return on 
equity (ROE) as an alternative measure of profitability. Higher ratios indicate improvement in 
performance. 
E. Labor (growth in staff levels and employee productivity) 
To ascertain whether a significant change in employment and labor productivity occurs 
after implementing Six Sigma, we analyzed three labor-related ratios. First, we use the ratio of 
asset-to-number of employees as a proxy for over-staffing and then analyze growth in staff levels 
to ascertain whether the Six Sigma firms reduced staff levels after implementing Six Sigma. 
Finally, we use the ratio of total revenue-to-number of employees to measure employee 
productivity. We expect that Six Sigma firms will place more emphasis on cost cutting and are 
therefore more likely to reduce employment and improve employee productivity after 
implementing Six Sigma. 
14 
 
The operating performance change is first examined by comparing the Six Sigma firms’ 
ratios from year -3 to year +5. Looking at the trend in performance over the pre- and post-Six 
Sigma periods is perhaps not adequate because it may be difficult to draw conclusions from the 
result (especially from the mean ratios) since these data are not adjusted for other possible 
factors that may affect these ratios. Therefore, any significant change for the Six Sigma firm 
could be due to the factors other than process improvement. To account for this, we also report 
the industry and size-adjusted median (mean) performance measures for the Six Sigma firms. We 
calculate industry and size adjusted performance as the difference between the Six Sigma firms’ 
ratios and the other firms’ ratios in their industry with similar size.  
The difference in the median performance for each year from year -3 to year +5 will be 
tested using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test calculated as 
      1/4  12  1/24    
where z is the Wilcoxon test statistics, w is the sum of the positive ranks, n is the number of 
observations, n(n-1)/4 is the mean of w, and   12  1/24  is the standard deviation 
of w. The significance of the mean change in the pre-Six Sigma period (year -3 to year -1) and 
the post-Six Sigma period (year 1 to year 5) performance is also examined by performing a t-test. 
The mean changes were also compared to the industry and size matched firms. 
F. Results 
The operating performance results are shown in Table 2. Panel A presents the median 
ratios of Six Sigma firms while Panel B presents the median ratios of industry and size matched 
firms. Panel C shows the results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the difference in median 
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ratios. Table 3, on the other hand, shows the results of difference in mean tests for pre and post 
implementation of Six Sigma. 
The results presented in Table 2 show that for most of the sample period, Six Sigma firms 
have lower liquidity compared to their matching firms before and after implementing Six Sigma. 
Median current ratio of Six Sigma firms declines even further after 1st year of implementation. 
The ratio starts to improve again after 3rd year however it becomes significantly lower than the 
matching firms 4 years after implementation, 1.33 compared to 1.55 of matching firms. Table 2 
also shows that our sample firms’ are up to par with their industry and size matched firms in 
terms of activity analysis and management efficiency. Since Six Sigma is designed to reduce 
defects and improve process, median inventory turnover ratio of our sample firms improve to 
8.03 three years after implementing Six Sigma compared to 6.32 of matching firms at 
significance level of 10%. However, implementing Six Sigma does not seem to indicate 
improved efficiencies across the board as we expected.   
 As for earnings ability, the results show that Six Sigma firms actually have significantly 
higher return on equity (ROE) before implementing Six Sigma compared to their industry and 
size matched firms. The median ROE of our sample firms is 0.16 is significantly higher than that 
of their matching firms, 0.11, three years prior to implementation at 1% level. The difference in 
ROE levels actually declines after implementing Six Sigma, drops to a 0.03 difference at 10% 
significance five years after implementation. The median difference in growth in staff levels  
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TABLE 2
OPERATING PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Year Liquidity Analysis Activity Analysis Management Efficiency Earnings Ability Labor
Current 
Ratio
Qucik 
Ratio
Net 
Working 
Capital
Asset 
Turnover
A/R 
Turnover
Inventor
y 
Turnover
Cost-to-
income
Expense-
to-assets
Gross 
Profit 
Margin
ROA ROE
Growth 
in Staff
Levels
Employe
e 
Productiv
ity
Over 
Employm
ent Proxy
Panel A: Median Ratios of Six Sigma Firms
-3 1.33 0.73 0.09 0.86 5.89 6.41 4.92 0.71 0.30 0.04 0.16 0.01 223.70 304.59
-2 1.31 0.77 0.08 0.89 5.95 6.18 5.29 0.73 0.30 0.04 0.17 0.02 221.96 318.65
-1 1.26 0.75 0.08 0.85 5.67 6.59 5.36 0.70 0.29 0.04 0.15 0.03 241.96 350.94
0 1.30 0.75 0.10 0.80 5.84 6.54 5.26 0.66 0.29 0.03 0.14 0.00 239.54 375.49
1 1.30 0.78 0.08 0.80 5.90 7.05 5.58 0.66 0.28 0.04 0.15 -0.01 254.01 402.47
2 1.29 0.77 0.09 0.84 5.82 7.54 5.82 0.73 0.28 0.03 0.15 0.00 260.08 423.94
3 1.35 0.81 0.09 0.78 6.06 8.03 5.75 0.67 0.28 0.03 0.15 0.00 284.34 415.80
4 1.33 0.80 0.09 0.77 6.02 7.86 5.80 0.63 0.29 0.03 0.14 0.00 290.95 451.83
5 1.36 0.83 0.08 0.81 6.14 8.19 5.71 0.69 0.29 0.04 0.15 0.01 310.53 450.95
Panel B: Median Ratios of Industry and Size Matched Firms
-3 1.51 0.92 0.16 0.77 5.54 5.45 5.12 0.65 0.33 0.03 0.11 0.02 245.88 406.49
-2 1.49 0.89 0.14 0.74 5.70 6.08 5.55 0.65 0.30 0.03 0.12 0.03 242.77 374.67
-1 1.38 0.92 0.12 0.78 5.40 6.27 5.99 0.66 0.29 0.03 0.11 0.02 228.34 367.48
0 1.40 0.89 0.09 0.69 5.21 5.45 6.08 0.61 0.30 0.03 0.12 0.01 236.22 371.88
1 1.46 0.86 0.12 0.80 5.77 6.34 6.12 0.67 0.29 0.03 0.11 0.02 253.61 419.41
2 1.43 0.83 0.10 0.74 5.87 6.07 6.57 0.64 0.30 0.03 0.12 0.02 290.56 448.08
3 1.49 0.90 0.14 0.78 5.78 6.32 4.78 0.65 0.29 0.04 0.12 0.01 304.57 472.60
4 1.55 0.93 0.12 0.80 6.17 5.98 5.15 0.68 0.30 0.04 0.12 0.01 311.84 492.41
5 1.52 0.91 0.12 0.83 6.04 6.97 5.56 0.67 0.31 0.04 0.12 0.01 325.74 451.39
Panel C: z-statistics for difference in median (Six Sigma - Industry and Size Matched Firms)
-3 -1.843* -2.555 -1.582 1.435 0.349 1.347 0.252 1.247 -0.283 1.377 3.182*** -0.671 -0.470 -1.582
-2 -1.505 -1.950*** -1.477 1.269 0.148 1.039 -0.350 0.971 0.344 0.653 2.710*** -1.466 -0.086 -0.892
-1 -1.951* -2.190** -2.359** 0.707 0.545 0.853 -0.971 0.510 0.284 0.801 2.344** 0.064 -0.009 -0.483
0 -1.503 -1.763* -1.293 1.032 0.801 1.553 -0.448 0.881 -0.540 0.842 3.208*** -1.656* 0.313 -0.392
1 -1.981** -1.489 -1.771* 0.577 -0.118 1.236 -0.025 0.561 -0.539 0.958 3.523*** -2.197** 0.079 -0.223
2 -1.611 -0.985 -0.974 0.702 -0.066 1.253 0.123 0.771 -1.191 -0.044 1.978** -2.696*** 0.130 -0.149
3 -1.622 -1.347 -1.296 0.803 0.169 1.802* 0.475 0.773 -1.402 -1.158 1.724* -1.380 0.071 -0.297
4 -2.137** -1.469 -1.593 0.390 -0.370 1.858* 0.044 0.463 -1.214 -1.439 0.537 -0.613 -0.065 -0.213
5 -1.355 -1.185 -1.042 0.552 0.106 1.561 -0.013 0.517 -1.018 -0.424 1.820* 0.344 0.250 -0.051
This table contains the median operating performance measures of the sample Six Sigma firms on Liquidity Analysis, Activity Analysis, Management Efficiency, Earnings Ability,  and Labor 
(employment levels and labor productivity). Panel A presents the ratios of the Six Sigma firms while Panel B presents the ratios of the industry and size matched firms. Panel C exhibits the z-
statistics for the Wilcoxon signed rank test of the difference in median ratios between the two samples. The symbols ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively (2-tailed test).
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Table 3
Difference in mean test
Ratio Six Sigma firms mean performance Pre-Six Sigma Post-Six Sigma
Post Pre Post-Pre t-statistic Six Sigma Matching Difference t-statistic Six Sigma Matching Difference t-statistic
Current Ratio 1.37 1.33 0.04 0.5292 1.33 1.645506 -0.32 -2.9827*** 1.37 1.638786 -0.27 -3.0854***
Qucik Ratio 0.89 0.80 0.08 1.3767 0.80 1.055291 -0.25 -3.2683*** 0.89 1.100571 -0.21 -2.5661**
Net Working Capital 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.2749 0.09 0.138186 -0.05 -2.2308*** 0.10 0.13221 -0.03 -1.8319*
Asset Turnover 1.01 1.01 0.00 -0.0076 1.01 0.875365 0.13 1.1677 1.01 0.852917 0.15 1.1442
A/R Turnover 8.11 8.19 -0.08 -0.0461 8.19 8.758556 -0.57 -0.4335 8.11 22.1397 -14.03 -1.5550
Inventory Turnover 50.32 46.45 3.87 0.1116 46.45 35.34184 11.11 0.2494 50.32 94.31861 -44.00 -0.9287
Cost-to-income 7.46 7.30 0.16 0.0956 7.30 -5.19459 12.49 1.1451 7.46 7.481808 -0.03 -0.3670
Expense-to-assets 0.89 0.88 0.01 0.068 0.88 0.765368 0.12 1.0368 0.89 0.735245 0.15 1.1461
Gross Profit Margin 0.35 0.35 -0.01 -0.1912 0.35 0.345756 0.01 0.2086 0.35 0.359788 -0.01 -0.2545
ROA 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.7326 0.04 0.009833 0.03 1.5133 0.03 0.040989 -0.01 -0.5231
ROE 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.2704 0.09 0.008602 0.08 0.9861 0.11 0.11302 -0.01 0.0294
Growth in Staff Levels 0.03 0.12 -0.09 -2.6105*** 0.12 2.068984 -1.95 -1.0823 0.03 0.109365 -0.08 -2.2049**
Employee Productivity 517.30 347.96 169.34 2.2117** 347.96 545.9235 -197.97 -1.2474 517.30 473.8812 43.41 0.3321
Over Employment Proxy 1276.39 836.67 439.72 1.5279 836.67 1880.665 -1043.99 -1.7465* 1276.39 1776.182 -499.79 -1.1521
This table shows the pre- and post-Six Sigma mean ratios and the relevant t-statistics for the sample based on Liquidity Analysis, Activity Analysis, Management 
Effiviency, Earnings Ability, and Labor (employment levels and labor productivity). The pre-Six Sigma mean ratios are calculated over the year -1 to year -3 period and 
the post-Six Sigma mean ratios are calculated over the year +1 to year +5 period. The symbols ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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starts to decline right after implementing Six Sigma. Two years after implementing, our sample 
firms experience 0 growth rate while matching firms experience 0.02 and the difference in 
growth in staff levels is statistically significant at 1% level. 
When we look at the mean performances, as shown in Table 3, the only statistically 
significant difference in performance measured before and after implementing Six Sigma are the 
growth in staff levels and employee productivity. We find that Six Sigma firms’ post and pre 
implementation difference in growth in staff levels is -0.09 at 1% significance level. Post-Six 
Sigma mean employment productivity ratio of revenue to number of employees is 169.34 higher 
than the pre-Six Sigma levels at 5%. This shows that while Six Sigma implementation reduces 
the number of employees, it also increases employee productivity. However, when we compare 
our sample firms with the matching firms both before and after implementing Six Sigma, we 
cannot see statistically significant difference in performances except for the growth in staff levels 
of -0.08 at 5%.  
 There are different types of implementing Six Sigma and the most common form is the 
corporate wide implementation for our sample firms. Majority of our sample firms committed to 
a corporate wide implementation as opposed to business unit, pilot or belts. We wanted to see if 
we would see better improved performances if companies were more committed to Six Sigma 
therefore conducted our mean tests on the smaller sample size of 85 firms that implemented Six 
Sigma at corporate level.  
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Table 4
Difference in mean test for Firms That Implemented Six Sigma Corporate-wide
Ratio Six Sigma firms mean performance Pre-Six Sigma Post-Six Sigma
Post Pre Post-Pre t-statistic Six Sigma Matching Difference t-statistic Six Sigma Matching Difference t-statistic
Current Ratio 1.37 1.30 0.07 0.9767 1.30 1.73 -0.43 -3.2135*** 1.37 1.68 -0.31 -3.2458***
Qucik Ratio 0.88 0.78 0.11 1.7445* 0.78 1.06 -0.28 -3.6278*** 0.88 1.12 -0.24 -2.7821***
Net Working Capital 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.6658 0.08 0.15 -0.07 -2.9720*** 0.10 0.14 -0.04 -2.1095**
Asset Turnover 0.99 1.00 -0.01 -0.1203 1.00 0.93 0.08 0.7364 0.99 0.88 0.11 1.0143
A/R Turnover 7.24 7.43 -0.19 -0.1445 7.43 9.65 -2.22 -1.1212 7.24 27.67 -20.43 -1.5213
Inventory Turnover 15.14 13.40 1.74 0.3833 13.40 44.85 -31.45 -1.1701 15.14 74.92 -59.77 -1.9690**
Cost-to-income 6.87 6.97 -0.09 -0.0501 6.97 -12.09 19.05 1.0602 6.87 8.33 -1.45 -0.7111
Expense-to-assets 0.87 0.87 0.00 -0.0345 0.87 0.81 0.06 0.6114 0.87 0.76 0.11 1.0038
Gross Profit Margin 0.33 0.34 -0.01 -0.2172 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.0400 0.33 0.36 -0.03 -0.8618
ROA 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.8342 0.04 0.03 0.01 1.0628 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.6113
ROE 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.8565 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.3081 0.13 0.10 0.04 1.2298
Growth in Staff Levels 0.02 0.13 -0.11 -2.5640** 0.13 2.40 -2.27 -1.0692 0.02 0.13 -0.11 -2.3966**
Employee Productivity 430.45 295.33 135.12 2.2389** 295.33 533.59 -238.26 -1.3790 430.45 466.23 -35.79 -0.4517
Over Employment Proxy 819.84 603.78 216.06 1.2218 603.78 1483.81 -880.03 -1.4020 819.84 1339.35 -519.51 -1.5666
This table shows the pre- and post-Six Sigma mean ratios and the relevant t-statistics for the sample based on Liquidity Analysis, Activity Analysis, Management 
Effiviency, Earnings Ability, and Labor (employment levels and labor productivity). The pre-Six Sigma mean ratios are calculated over the year -1 to year -3 period and 
the post-Six Sigma mean ratios are calculated over the year +1 to year +5 period. The symbols ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
20 
 
Table 4 shows the mean performances of firms that implemented Six Sigma corporate-
wide compared to their industry and size matched firms. The results are quite similar to what we 
found earlier. The quick ratio of these firms improved 0.11 however only at 10% significance 
level. Growth in staff levels declined 0.11 while employee productivity increased 135.12. Pre 
and post Six Sigma performances of this smaller sample firms compared to their industry and 
size matched firms are similar to the larger sample except for the inventory turnover ratio. While 
the mean inventory sample ratio of the larger sample, compared to the matching firms, did not 
show any difference after implementing Six Sigma, the smaller sample indicated a 59.77 
reduction in inventory level at 5% level post-Six Sigma.  
 The earliest implementation of Six Sigma by our sample firms is 1987 however most 
firms implemented in 1990’s and 2000’s. To account for early implementation and look for 
advantages of early movers, we split our sample into two; firms that implemented Six Sigma 
before 2001, and firms that implemented after 2000 since our median implementation is 2001. 
Table 5 shows the mean results of early movers which implemented before 2001, while Table 6 
shoes the mean results of the later implementers.  
Based on results shown in Table 5, we see that the mean gross profit margin of the firms 
that implemented Six Sigma is actually 0.07 lower than that industry and size matched firms 
prior to Six Sigma. This ratio gap only declines to 0.01 and becomes -0.06 difference after Six 
Sigma at 10% significance level. This is an indicator that the billions of dollars of savings that 
these firms claim they experienced after implementing Six Sigma, does not reflect to their 
bottom-line; profit margins. When we look at the later implementers in Table 6, the results are 
quite similar to the overall performances of these firms.  
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Table 5
Difference in mean test for Firms That Implemented Six Sigma Before 2001
Ratio Six Sigma firms mean performance Pre-Six Sigma Post-Six Sigma
Post Pre Post-Pre t-statistic Six Sigma Matching Difference t-statistic Six Sigma Matching Difference t-statistic
Current Ratio 1.27 1.26 0.01 0.1019 1.26 1.68 -0.42 -2.4059** 1.27 1.59 -0.32 -2.8626***
Qucik Ratio 0.78 0.76 0.02 0.2778 0.76 1.05 -0.28 -2.7739*** 0.78 1.04 -0.26 -2.7227***
Net Working Capital 0.08 0.08 0.00 -0.1915 0.08 0.14 -0.06 -2.2057** 0.08 0.13 -0.05 -2.0666***
Asset Turnover 1.02 1.03 -0.02 -0.1333 1.03 0.89 0.15 1.2601 1.02 0.91 0.11 0.6665
A/R Turnover 5.81 5.62 0.19 0.2663 5.62 9.02 -3.40 -1.5353 5.81 20.77 -14.97 -1.1609
Inventory Turnover 14.23 12.18 2.05 0.6278 12.18 39.14 -26.96 -0.8339 14.23 13.77 0.46 0.1082
Cost-to-income 6.70 7.28 -0.58 -0.1799 7.28 -8.50 15.78 0.7137 6.70 0.80 5.90 -0.6733
Expense-to-assets 0.90 0.92 -0.01 -0.1054 0.92 0.78 0.14 1.2187 0.90 0.80 0.10 0.6456
Gross Profit Margin 0.27 0.28 -0.01 -0.2952 0.28 0.35 -0.07 -2.0134** 0.27 0.33 -0.06 -1.7447*
ROA 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.5735 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.6955 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.1514
ROE 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.8562 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.1523 0.11 0.06 0.06 1.2227
Growth in Staff Levels 0.03 0.14 -0.11 -2.0241** 0.14 1.86 -1.72 -0.6786 0.03 0.18 -0.16 -1.7342*
Employee Productivity 353.98 251.53 102.45 1.6282* 251.53 516.84 -265.31 -1.2796 353.98 366.70 -12.73 -0.1546
Over Employment Proxy 708.68 470.88 237.80 1.0501 470.88 2085.33 -1614.46 -1.4565 708.68 741.36 -32.68 -0.1150
This table shows the pre- and post-Six Sigma mean ratios and the relevant t-statistics for the sample based on Liquidity Analysis, Activity Analysis, Management 
Effiviency, Earnings Ability, and Labor (employment levels and labor productivity). The pre-Six Sigma mean ratios are calculated over the year -1 to year -3 period and 
the post-Six Sigma mean ratios are calculated over the year +1 to year +5 period. The symbols ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 6
Difference in mean test for Firms That Implemented Six Sigma After 2000
Ratio Six Sigma firms mean performance Pre-Six Sigma Post-Six Sigma
Post Pre Post-Pre t-statistic Six Sigma Matching Difference t-statistic Six Sigma Matching Difference t-statistic
Current Ratio 1.43 1.37 0.06 0.5659 1.37 1.77 -0.40 -2.2061** 1.43 1.69 -0.26 -1.9987**
Qucik Ratio 0.95 0.83 0.12 1.4584 0.83 1.07 -0.24 -2.3445** 0.95 1.13 -0.17 -1.5053
Net Working Capital 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.4615 0.10 0.14 -0.04 -1.4686 0.11 0.14 -0.02 -0.9197
Asset Turnover 1.00 0.99 0.01 0.0628 0.99 0.83 0.16 1.1239 1.00 0.86 0.14 0.9152
A/R Turnover 9.64 9.79 -0.15 -0.0548 9.79 9.92 -0.13 -0.0430 9.64 26.26 -16.61 -1.1181
Inventory Turnover 76.28 70.50 5.78 0.0979 70.50 55.12 15.38 0.3177 76.28 132.96 -56.68 -0.8315
Cost-to-income 7.97 7.31 0.66 0.3642 7.31 -18.49 25.80 1.1540 7.97 7.27 0.70 0.4017
Expense-to-assets 0.88 0.86 0.02 0.1328 0.86 0.72 0.13 0.9729 0.88 0.74 0.14 0.9358
Gross Profit Margin 0.40 0.40 0.00 -0.0283 0.40 0.36 0.03 0.8753 0.40 0.37 0.03 0.6987
ROA 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.4313 0.05 -0.02 0.06 1.6225 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.4147
ROE 0.10 0.15 -0.05 -0.9212 0.15 -0.08 0.23 1.3616 0.10 0.14 -0.03 0.5694
Growth in Staff Levels 0.03 0.11 -0.08 -1.7153* 0.11 2.86 -2.75 -1.0451 0.03 0.07 -0.04 -2.3450**
Employee Productivity 628.77 413.28 215.49 1.8106* 413.28 647.66 -234.38 -1.0853 628.77 562.61 66.16 0.4900
Over Employment Proxy 1663.87 1084.46 579.40 1.2852 1084.46 3047.43 -1962.96 -1.7106* 1663.87 2385.48 -721.62 -1.0994
This table shows the pre- and post-Six Sigma mean ratios and the relevant t-statistics for the sample based on Liquidity Analysis, Activity Analysis, Management 
Effiviency, Earnings Ability, and Labor (employment levels and labor productivity). The pre-Six Sigma mean ratios are calculated over the year -1 to year -3 period and 
the post-Six Sigma mean ratios are calculated over the year +1 to year +5 period. The symbols ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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V. Summary and conclusion 
In this paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of the pre- and post-Six Sigma 
performances of Fortune 500 firms that implemented Six Sigma as Total Quality Management 
(TQM) initiative. We argue that managers may be implementing TQM to signal to investors their 
commitment to improved efficiency and bottom-line. We also argue that these programs reduce 
the agency costs by improving efficiency. 
First, we analyzed the market adjusted as well as buy-and-hold abnormal returns to see if 
firms that implement Six Sigma under-performed or over-performed the market. Our findings 
show that firms that implemented Six Sigma outperformed the market as well as the S&P 500 
index; however their performance is not up to par with the firms within the same industry which 
are close to their size. This may be due to a big competition within their respective industries 
which puts the management under pressure.  
Second, we investigated the improvements in the operating performance of the firms that 
implement Six Sigma by looking at 14 ratios grouped under five criteria; liquidity, activity, 
management, earnings ability, labor. We had expected that the firms which implement Six Sigma 
would show improved results and better performance compared to their industry and size 
matching firms, however due to a possible high training costs as well as high opportunity costs 
our results show some conflicting results which may have important implications for the firms as 
well as their investors. 
Even though our sample firms improved several variables after implementing Six Sigma, 
they were not quite close to the performances of matching firms. After implementing Six Sigma, 
compared to the industry and size matched firms, the only variable that improves out of 14 
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variables we looked at, is the growth in staff levels. The Six Sigma phenomenon may be one of 
the reasons behind “jobless recovery” economists have been discussing recent years. 
We conclude that implementing Six Sigma may reduce agency cost in the long run and 
help the firms catch-up with the level of abnormal returns their industry and size matched piers 
are achieving. It also looks like managers may be using Six Sigma as a signaling tool to commit 
to their customers as well as investors for better quality goods and services. Investors seem to 
believe in this commitment in the long run since even though operating performances do not 
show significant difference after implementing Six Sigma, abnormal returns keeps increasing.   
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Chapter 2 
Returns Predictability in Emerging Real Estate Market 
Since the collapse of the US subprime market in 2007, much attention has been given to 
the linkage between real estate markets and the macroeconomic variables as well as financial 
markets in developed countries. Several studies showed that real estate markets and stock 
markets are integrated (Lin and Lin, 2011; Liow and Webb, 2009) and macroeconomic variables 
also have effects on these markets (Kishor, 2007; Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2009; Miller, Peng and 
Sklarz, 2009). Investments to real estate, however, has a major disadvantage; liquidity. Despite 
of the several disadvantages, investments to securitized real estate have been increasing 
exponentially. According to Brounen et al. (2006) the market capitalization for securitized real 
estate was at USD 800 billion level by the end of 2005. There are several types of securitized 
real estate available out there such as closed and open-end funds, listed real estate companies, 
REIT’s or real estate private equity companies.  
Property price fluctuations has played a role in past business cycles, stimulating the 
upswing and increasing the downswing.  On the other hand, business cycles cause property price 
fluctuations as well. Improvements in overall economic conditions tend to increase the income of 
households and therefore boost the demand for new homes which puts an upward pressure on 
house prices. The movements of real estate prices and the extent to which they interact with the 
financial sector and the macro-economy have been given attention by the monetary authorities 
and financial regulators.  
Macroeconomic theory suggests that money serves as a proxy for the substitution effect 
of the monetary policy since asset prices matter for aggregate demand. On one hand an 
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expansion of money supply influences both the mean and the dynamics of inflation (Nelson, 
2003). On the other hand not only house prices influence monetary developments, relationship 
can be both ways; there is a strong link from liquidity to the real estate market in the US and 
Euro area (Greiber and Setzer, 2007).  
For industrialized countries, Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) show a significant 
multidirectional link between house prices, broad money, private credit and the macro-economy. 
Their results show that money growth has a significant effect on house prices and private credit, 
private credit effects money as well as house prices and finally house prices influence both 
private credit and money. The study of Greiber and Setzer (2007) also shows strong evidence 
that monetary policy influences housing market developments by improving financing 
conditions, thereby increasing demand for housing for the US and Euro area. Emerging markets, 
on the other hand, can have different dynamics therefore we may not expect the same results as 
in the industrialized countries. 
 Our main objective is to investigate the interrelationship between the emerging markets 
real estate index returns and broad money, private credit and the macro-economy among 19 
emerging markets. To our knowledge, no research has been conducted on emerging markets real 
estate price indices, and money, credit and macro variables on a broad level.   
I. Motivation 
Just like any other security, real estate investment also has its risks including falling 
property values, lack of liquidity, limited diversification and sensitivity to certain economic and 
financial factors. The question we are looking for is if there is evidence of a significant link 
among house price indices, money, credit and the macro economy. Goodhart (2007) argue that 
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modern-style macro models are inherently non-monetary. He claims “…Since there are by 
construction no banks, no borrowing constraints and no risks of default, the risk free short-term 
interest rate serves to model the monetary side of the economy. As a consequence, money or 
credit aggregates and asset prices play no role in standard versions of these models.”  
Interest rates have direct effects on house prices. House prices appear to be associated 
with business-cycle movements in a number of real variables, such as consumption and 
investment. Researches have not fully agreed on as to whether accommodative policy has 
contributed to the volatility of house or other asset prices. It can be argued that because house 
prices, macroeconomic and monetary variables move in response to other outside shocks hitting 
the economy, the direction of the relationship or the extent of causality among these variables 
can be difficult to point out. 
The main objectives of the central banks are not necessarily in line with the goals for 
asset prices, particularly house prices; however house price changes can have important 
implications for economic activity and inflation. This effect has become especially more 
important since 2008 crisis. The consequences of excess changes in house prices also should be 
watched carefully by central banks and other government agencies that regulate financial 
institutions for the purpose of financial stability. Even though in the past, major declines in real 
house prices have often been associated with economic downturns, 2008 crises showed us that 
the opposite is also true; economic downturn can be caused by a decline in real house prices, 
especially when collateral values also decline significantly. 
There is not a consensus among central banks as to how to react to excess changes in 
house prices. Some researchers argue that we should trust the markets therefore central banks 
should continue focusing on their goal of low inflation and output stability. However, there are 
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also several researchers who claim central banks should act to prevent bubbles in real estate 
prices to avoid financial as well as macroeconomic turbulences. The question is then how should 
central banks respond to movements in asset prices? There is also not a consensus on this 
question. Some researches advise that the price index targeted by a central bank should also 
include the future prices of goods and services as well as assets. Some researchers, on the other 
hand, argue that as long as the asset prices affect the forecast of future goods and services price 
inflation, they can be subject to the monetary policy. They claim central banks should respond to 
changes in asset prices by calculating the effect of the change in asset prices on expected 
inflation, and then adjusting the interest rates. Several researchers also point out that the changes 
in asset prices have implications for the stability of the financial sector; therefore there is an 
indirect relationship with monetary policy as well. If there is a bubble in asset prices, a correction 
might be inevitable. When the correction occurs it can be very costly to financial institutions 
therefore can impair the financial stability. It is clear that understanding the sources of asset price 
movements becomes a key element in determining the necessary monetary policy response. 
Hence, movements of real estate prices and the how these movements effect the financial sector 
and the macro-economy should closely be monitored by monetary authorities and financial 
regulators. 
Using the fixed effects panel data approach, we analyze the variation in 19 emerging 
markets real estate index returns. The results show that money market rate as well as growth in 
GDP, Consumer Price Index, private credit and money supply have significant predictive power 
on growth in real estate price indices a quarter ahead. Using Vector Autoregression Model 
(VAR) methodology, the findings are expected to contribute to the evaluation of the emerging 
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markets real estate price index behavior taking into consideration of several financial and 
economic factors. 
Granger Causality tests reveal strong evidence of multi-directional causality between 
house prices, GDP, CPI, interest rates, money, and credit. In almost every country we 
investigated, forecast errors to GDP, CPI and money market rate play an important role in 
explaining innovations to the real estate price index returns.  
The rest of the study is outlined as follows. Section 2 conducts a literature review. 
Section 3 explains the data as well as the variables used. Section 4 outlines the framework of the 
methodology used in this study. Section 5 presents the conclusion of the study.  
II. Literature Review 
The academic studies primarily focus on the link between the housing sector and its 
economy. Using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model Baffoe-Bonnie (1998) tries explain the 
relationship between house prices and macroeconomic key aggregates in US sub-regions. He 
finds that variables influence very differently across these sub-regions. Kasparova and White 
(2001) examine the housing markets in selected European countries using VECM. They show 
that effect of house prices on GDP is significantly greater than the effect of GDP on house 
prices. Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) investigate the impact of GDP, inflation and the interest rates 
over house prices. They show that the main reason behind the changes in house prices is the 
inflation hedge characteristics of residential real estate. They also show that the importance of 
interest rates became more obvious in the last decade of their study.   
In a Federal Reserve Bank International Finance Discussion Paper (2005), Aherane et al. 
found that in 18 major industrial countries real house prices are pro-cyclical and they move 
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together with real GDP, consumption, investment, CPI inflation, budget and current account 
balances, and output gaps. They show that house price booms are preceded by a period of easing 
monetary policy. After a period of rising inflation, monetary authorities begin to tighten policies 
before house prices peak. 
Goodhart and Hoffman (2008) show that there is evidence of a significant 
multidirectional link between house prices, broad money, private credit and the macro economy 
among 17 industrialized countries. Their main results reveal that there is evidence of a 
significant multidirectional link between house prices, monetary variables and the macro-
economy. They also results suggest that the link between housing prices and monetary variables 
is stronger over more recent years and that the effects of shocks to money and credit are stronger 
when housing prices are booming. In a more recent study, Beltratti and Morana (2010) suggested 
countries that macroeconomic variables, such as interest rates and monetary aggregates, affect 
housing prices in G7 countries.   
Asset-price volatility is believed to have been critical effected by the macro-economy. 
(Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002). Several research show that the housing market has a significant 
connection with the performance of the overall economy and with monetary policy (Darrat and 
Glascock, 1989; Ball, 1994; Baffoe-Bonnie, 1998; Lastrapes, 2002; Jin and Zeng, 2004, 
Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008). Darrat and Glascock (1989) examined the causal relationship 
between money supply and real estate return and found that money supply plays an important 
role in changes in real estate return. Breedon and Joyce (1992) added gross financial wealth into 
their housing price model. They claim that money supply has a lagged effect on current real 
estate returns, implying a possible rejection of market efficiency. More recent studies have 
discussed how the relationship between money supply and asset investment leads to strong 
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housing price fluctuation. Lastrapes (2002) used VAR model to estimate the dynamic response 
of housing prices to money supply shocks and interpreted these responses based on the asset 
view of housing demand. Jin and Zeng (2004) found that monetary policy and nominal interest 
rates play a significant role in the determination of housing prices, as do money shocks by 
generating remarkably volatile residential investment.  
Kim (2005) looked at differential effects of monetary policy on housing sub-markets, 
specifically new home construction and existing home sales. Findings show that the existing 
home sale market is relatively more affected by expansionary monetary policies than is the new 
home construction market in the short run. 
McCue and Kling (1994) examine the relationship between US equity REIT series 
returns and a set of macroeconomic variables. The findings indicate that nearly 60% of the 
variation in real estate prices is explained by the macro economy; thereby it is the nominal short-
term interest rate variable that explains the majority of the real estate price movement. In a more 
recent study by Ewing and Payne (2005), it is found that shocks to monetary policy, economic 
growth, and inflation have negative impact on expected REIT returns, while on the other hand 
shocks to the default risk premium have positive impact on future expected returns. 
Mei and Lee (1994) found the presence of a real estate factor, in addition to both a stock 
factor and a bond factor in asset pricing. They suggest that mutual fund managers should 
consider including real estate assets in their portfolios.  
Gyourko and Keim (1992) found evidence that REIT returns in the US stock market 
predict returns to un-securitized returns to commercial properties. They concluded that the prior 
year's REIT return is significant in predicting the current year's un-securitized real estate return. 
Myer and Webb (1993) also analyzed the lead-lag relationship using Granger causality. Their 
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findings show that equity REITs Granger cause un-securitized real estate returns.  Quan and 
Titman (1999) prove that real estate is positively affected by inflation as well as GDP. 
Ray and Vani (2003) prove that interest rates, industrial production, money supply, 
inflation and exchange rates have significant affect over equity prices. Hoesli et al. (2008) 
present the inflation characteristics of real estate investment in the United Kingdom as well as 
the United States. They show a positive relationship between commercial real estate returns and 
expected inflation in both countries.  
Schatz and Sebastian (2009) find a positive linkage between the property markets and 
consumer prices as well as the government bonds, while the property markets are negatively 
affected by the respective unemployment rates for Germany and the UK. Schatz, in his second 
essay, study on the issue of whether real estate stock indices are primarily driven by the progress 
of property markets or by developments on general stock markets for the US and the UK. He 
shows that the real estate equity markets are predominantly driven by the underlying properties. 
III. Data and Variables 
Emerging markets Real Estate Price Index data for 19 Emerging Markets (see Appendix 
A.) provided by Reidin.com; Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hong Kong Sar, Hungary, 
Israel, Indonesia, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, Malaysia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, 
Slovak Republic, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey. The sample period ranges 
from 1966Q1 to 2012Q2 which makes an unbalanced panel data set with a total of 906 quarters. 
On average there are 47 quarters per country; South Africa has the longest sample period with 
186 quarters, whereas Thailand has the shortest with 18 quarters. The details of each country 
period is provided in the Appendix.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table shows the summary statistics which are computed as the averages of each country i’s time-series statistics. !,. is the 
quarterly growth of the real estate price indices of 19 emerging countries provided by REIDIN.com; "#$,,  is the quarterly 
growth of GDP; %%,,  is the level of quarterly Money Market Rate; $&,, is the growth of Consumer Price Index; #, is 
the log of private credit and %3, is the log of money supply. Panel A is the summary statistics of all 19 countries. Panel B is the 
summary statistics of 11 Eastern European emerging countries; Turkey, Bulgaria, Russia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Hungry, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Poland. Panel C is the summary statistics of 5 Asian emerging countries; Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A – All countries 
 Variable RE GDP MMR CPI D M3  
 Mean  0.017  0.012 6.208  0.014  11.012  5.841  
 Standard deviation  0.048  0.078 7.981  0.019  2.301  3.977  
 Minimum -0.233 -0.326 0.060 -0.034  6.686 -0.704  
 Maximum  0.389  0.303 196.153  0.383  14.554 17.031  
 Observations N 906 901 904 906 713 800  
 Observations n 19 19 19 19 18 17  
 Observations T-bar 47.684 47.421 47.579 47.684 39.611 47.059  
Panel B – Eastern Europe 
 Variable RE GDP MMR CPI D M3  
 Mean  0.019  0.013 4.838  0.014  9.910  6.840  
 Standard deviation  0.063  0.103 10.891  0.024  1.925  2.410  
 Minimum -0.233 -0.326 0.100 -0.024  6.686  3.285  
 Maximum  0.389  0.303 196.153  0.382  13.716 10.993  
 Observations N 380 379 373 380 254 330  
 Observations n 11 11 11 11 10 11  
 Observations T-bar 34.556 34.455 33.909 34.545 26.400 30.00  
Panel C – Asia 
 Variable RE GDP MMR CPI D M3  
 Mean  0.011  0.015 5.718  0.010 11.090  7.698  
 Standard deviation  0.038  0.071 4.332  0.013  2.561  5.685  
 Minimum -0.169 -0.228 0.060 -0.034  7.136  1.450  
 Maximum  0.191  0.173 23.927  0.103  14.083 17.013  
 Observations N 268 265 270 268 234 209  
 Observations n 5 5 5 5 5 3  
 Observations T-bar 53.600 53.000 54.000 53.600 46.800 69.667  
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Figure 1 
House Price Indices in Emerging Countries 
 
This graph displays quarterly house price indices in 19 Emerging Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
500
1000
1500
1
9
9
7
Q
1
1
9
9
8
Q
2
1
9
9
9
Q
3
2
0
0
0
Q
4
2
0
0
2
Q
1
2
0
0
3
Q
2
2
0
0
4
Q
3
2
0
0
5
Q
4
2
0
0
7
Q
1
2
0
0
8
Q
2
2
0
0
9
Q
3
2
0
1
0
Q
4
2
0
1
2
Q
1
Bulgaria
0
50
100
150
200
250
1
9
9
3
Q
1
1
9
9
4
Q
2
1
9
9
5
Q
3
1
9
9
6
Q
4
1
9
9
8
Q
1
1
9
9
9
Q
2
2
0
0
0
Q
3
2
0
0
1
Q
4
2
0
0
3
Q
1
2
0
0
4
Q
2
2
0
0
5
Q
3
2
0
0
6
Q
4
2
0
0
8
Q
1
2
0
0
9
Q
2
2
0
1
0
Q
3
2
0
1
1
Q
4
Hong Kong
0
50
100
150
200
2
0
0
4
Q
1
2
0
0
4
Q
3
2
0
0
5
Q
1
2
0
0
5
Q
3
2
0
0
6
Q
1
2
0
0
6
Q
3
2
0
0
7
Q
1
2
0
0
7
Q
3
2
0
0
8
Q
1
2
0
0
8
Q
3
2
0
0
9
Q
1
2
0
0
9
Q
3
2
0
1
0
Q
1
2
0
1
0
Q
3
Czech Republic
0
500
1000
1500
2
0
0
3
Q
3
2
0
0
4
Q
2
2
0
0
5
Q
1
2
0
0
5
Q
4
2
0
0
6
Q
3
2
0
0
7
Q
2
2
0
0
8
Q
1
2
0
0
8
Q
4
2
0
0
9
Q
3
2
0
1
0
Q
2
2
0
1
1
Q
1
2
0
1
1
Q
4
Estonia
0
50
100
150
2
0
0
1
Q
4
2
0
0
2
Q
3
2
0
0
3
Q
2
2
0
0
4
Q
1
2
0
0
4
Q
4
2
0
0
5
Q
3
2
0
0
6
Q
2
2
0
0
7
Q
1
2
0
0
7
Q
4
2
0
0
8
Q
3
2
0
0
9
Q
2
2
0
1
0
Q
1
2
0
1
0
Q
4
2
0
1
1
Q
3
2
0
1
2
Q
2
Hungary
0
50
100
150
200
2
0
0
2
Q
1
2
0
0
2
Q
4
2
0
0
3
Q
3
2
0
0
4
Q
2
2
0
0
5
Q
1
2
0
0
5
Q
4
2
0
0
6
Q
3
2
0
0
7
Q
2
2
0
0
8
Q
1
2
0
0
8
Q
4
2
0
0
9
Q
3
2
0
1
0
Q
2
2
0
1
1
Q
1
2
0
1
1
Q
4
Indonesia
37 
 
Figure 1 (Continued) 
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Figure 1 (Continued) 
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Other variables are obtained from IFS and OECD. Missing variables are found from each 
country’s central bank or other official resources. The variables that we used are; the growth of 
real estate price indices, the growth of real GDP, the growth of consumer price index, the level of 
the short-term nominal interest rate, the log of nominal broad money and the log of nominal 
private credit. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the country level data which are computed as the 
averages of each country’s time-series statistics. Mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum values and observation details are reported for the data set. Panel A is the summary 
statistics of all 19 countries. Panel B is the summary statistics of 11 Eastern European emerging 
countries; Turkey, Bulgaria, Russia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungry, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, and Poland. Panel C is the summary statistics of 5 Asian emerging 
countries; Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Table 1 shows that the 
mean growth of the 19 emerging markets real estate price indices is 0.017, while the growth rate 
is lower in Asian emerging countries, it is actually higher in Eastern European emerging 
countries.   
Figure 1 shows the quarterly real estate price indices of 19 emerging markets. It is expect 
to see a positive trend in house prices due to growing populations. Land is an important factor in 
housing obviously and is in fixed supply, therefore housing becomes relatively scarce, and the 
relative price rises. While some countries show a continuous growth in their study periods, others 
show busts and booms. 
Figure 2 shows the quarterly percent change in house price indices (solid line) and the 
quarterly percent change in real GDP (dotted line) in 19 emerging markets. Figure 3 shows the 
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quarterly percent change in house price indices (solid line) and the quarterly percent change in 
CPI (dotted line) in our sample countries. 
The figures reveal that, while there might be a correlation between growth in real estate 
indices and GDP as well as CPI, the relationship is not perfect at all. Growth in real estate prices 
in some countries move in the same direction with growth in GDP, However, several countries 
also show a deviation in the direction of this relationship. The similar pattern is also found in the 
relationship between the growth in real estate price indices and the growth in CPI in these 
countries. This also means that there will not be a major multicollinearity problem including 
these variables in our empirical model.  
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Figure 2 
House Price and GDP Growth in Emerging Countries 
 
This graph displays quarterly percent change in house price indices (solid line) and real GDP (dotted line) 
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Figure 2 (Continued) 
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Figure 2 (Continued) 
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Figure 3 
House Price and CPI Growth in Emerging Countries 
 
This graph displays quarterly percent change in house price indices (solid line) and CPI (dotted line) 
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Figure 3 (Continued) 
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Figure 3 (Continued) 
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IV. Framework 
A. Predictability of Real Estate Price Index Returns 
A.1. Parameter Estimates 
The fixed-effects panel data regression shows the relationship between the Real Estate 
Price  Index returns and the independent variables; GDP, money market rate (MMR), consumer 
price index (CPI), private credit (D) and money supply (M3) 
rj,t = αj + βZj,t + εj,t   (1) 
r is index return for country j at time t and independent variables for country j are defined by Z at 
time t. 
 
Table 2 
Fixed Effects Regression 
 
 
This table shows the parameter estimates and standard errors for real estate price index returns from the fixed effects regression 
results with clustered standard errors. In the regression, dependent variable is the quarterly growth on the real estate price indices 
of 19 emerging countries provided by REIDIN.com; !,. Independent variables are growth of "#$,, level of Money Market 
Rate %%,, growth of Consumer Price Index $&,, log of private credit #, and log of money supply%3,. Standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Effects Panel Regressions 
 Constant GDP MMR CPI D M3 ()  
 
 
  
 
    
    0.294*** 0.035 -0.002*** 0.270*** -0.055*** 0.059*** 0.16  
 (0.079) (0.053) (0.001) (0.100) (0.016) (0.016)   
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Table 2 shows the parameter estimates and standard errors for real estate price index 
regression results. Results show that all of the coefficients, except for GDP, are statistically 
significant at 1% level. Money market rate, growth in CPI, private credit and M3 are all 
positively correlated with the growth in real estate price index returns. Coefficient signs also 
seem to be in line with the current literature on real estate in developed countries. Quan and 
Titman (1999) and Hoesli et al. (2008) found positive relationship between real estate returns 
and anticipated inflation in the US and the UK. McCue and King (1994) claim that nominal short 
term interest rate explains majority of the variation in real estate series.  
A.2. Forecasting Real Estate Price Index Returns  
To test whether house prices, credit, money and economic activity can predict one-
quarter-ahead market returns in emerging countries, fixed-effects panel data regression is used. 
rj,t +1 = αj + δXj,t + ξj,t+1  (2) 
r is index return for country j at time t+1 and independent variables for country j are defined by 
X at time t. The lagged dependent variable is also added as a control variable. As stated by 
Ferson et al. (2003) persistent dependent variables may result in a spurious regression. In panel 
data, the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms is simply the combination of variance-
covariance matrices of each country which, aside from the autocorrelation of the error terms 
within each country, causes a contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation. This can inflate the t-
statistics by a significant amount. To correct this, we compute standard errors in the existence of 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous cross-correlations as suggested by Rogers (1983, 1993). 
By estimating intercepts, α, separately for each country j, we lower to the country-level data and 
make sure that each country’s error term is orthogonal to the explanatory variables for that 
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country. Therefore, in a panel data form using fixed effects regression, the results reject the time-
series relation between the dependent and independent variables. In equation (2), the slope 
coefficient, δ, together with its clustered standard errors, shows whether there is a statistically 
significant relation between thee real estate price index returns and broad money, private credit 
and macro economy. 
 
Table 3 
Forecasting Real Estate Price Index 
 
 
This table shows the parameter estimates and standard errors for real estate price index returns from the fixed effects regression 
results with clustered standard errors. In the regression, dependent variable is the lead quarterly growth of the real estate price 
indices of 19 emerging countries provided by REIDIN.com; !,*. Independent lagged variables are growth of the real estate 
price index; !,, growth of "#$,, level of Money Market Rate %%,, growth of Consumer Price Index $&,, log of 
private credit #, and log of money supply %3,. Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate 
significance level at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Effects Panel Regressions 
 
Constant       RE GDP MMR CPI D M3 ()  
 
 
 
  
 
    
1  0.016***   0.053      0.04  
 (0.003) (0.038)       
2  0.021***  -0.001**     0.05  
 (0.003)  (0.001)      
3  0.015***    0.176***    0.04  
 (0.003)   (0.066)     
4  0.042*    -0.002   0.06  
 (0.024)    (0.002)    
5  0.029***     -0.002*  0.06  
 (0.006)     (0.001)   
6  0.193***  0.491***  0.061** -0.001**  0.216* -0.037***  0.040***  0.37  
 (0.058) (0.062) (0.024) (0.001) (0.130) (0.011) (0.022)   
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Table 3 shows the univariate regression of the one quarter ahead real estate price index 
returns on growth of GDP, level of MMR, growth of CPI, log of D and log of M3. Second row 
shows that the money market rate is negatively correlated with the future growth in real estate 
price index returns at 5% significance level with a t-statistics of -2.56 when it is regressed alone. 
Growth in money supply, M3, as seen in row five, is also negatively correlated with the future 
growth in real estate price index returns at 10% level with a t-statistics of -1.74 when it is 
regressed alone. Both variables have statistically significant predictive power. On the other hand, 
third row reveals that growth in CPI is positively correlated with the future growth in real estate 
price index returns at 1% level with a t-statistics of 2.67. CPI has a strong predictive power. 
When we regress all of the variables together, we see that all of our variables significantly 
predicts the growth in real estate price index returns. Interestingly in this setting, GDP and 
private credit have forecasting power so they are statistically significant as opposed to when they 
were regressed by themselves. The coefficient of GDP is 0.061 with a t-statistics of 2.54, 
whereas the coefficient of D is -0.037 with a t-statistics of -3.32. This means that when there is a 
positive growth in private credit, the real estate price indices tend to be negatively affected from 
this the following quarter. We explain this by the lack of organized mortgage markets in 
emerging markets as well as the structure of financial institutions. When private credit to 
businesses increase, available money to the real estate markets might be declining therefore 
affecting the growth in prices negatively. Our results show that there is a strong negative 
correlation between the growth in real estate price indices and the lagged money market rates 
and private credit. There is a strong positive correlation between the growth in real estate price 
indices and the lagged growth in GDP, CPI and log of M3.  
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 We wanted to see if the predictive power of these variables is different for different 
regions. When we regress one quarter ahead real estate price index returns on our money, credit 
and macro variables in Eastern European emerging markets and Asian emerging markets in our 
sample, we actually get different results. Table 4 reveals that in Eastern Europe, only GDP has 
predictive power a quarter ahead at 5% significance level. The other variables are not statistically 
significant even at 10% level. However in Asian emerging countries, money market rate, private 
credit and money supply have significantly predictive power at 1% level.   
 
Table 4 
Forecasting Real Estate Price Index for Different Regions 
 
 
This table shows the parameter estimates and standard errors for real estate price index returns from the fixed effects regression 
results with clustered standard errors. In the regression, dependent variable is the lead quarterly growth of the real estate price 
indices provided by REIDIN.com; !,*. Independent lagged variables are growth of the real estate price index; !,, growth 
of "#$,, level of Money Market Rate %%,, growth of Consumer Price Index $&,, log of private credit #, and log of 
money supply %3,. Panel A is the fixed effects regression results of 11 Eastern European emerging countries; Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Russia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungry, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Poland. Panel B is the 
fixed effects regression results of 5 Asian emerging countries; Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance level at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A - Fixed Effects Panel Regression for Eastern Europe 
 
Constant   RE  GDP  MMR  CPI  D M3 () 
 
  0.140*  0.458***  0.083** -0.001  0.261 -0.037  0.037  0.32  
 (0.075) (0.079) (0.039) (0.002) (0.266) (0.034) (0.045)   
 
      
  
Panel B - Fixed Effects Panel Regression for Asia 
 
Constant   RE  GDP  MMR  CPI  D  M3 () 
 
  0.305***  0.484***  0.006 -0.003***  0.094 -0.060***  0.050***  0.48  
 (0.063) (0.084) (0.024) (0.001) (0.182) (0.016) (0.016)   
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B. Relationship among house prices, credit, money and economic activity 
The analysis is quarterly data for 19 emerging markets spanning the period 1966-2012. 
To investigate the relationship among our variables as well as the direction of the relationship, 
we used Vector Auto-regression, Granger Causality, and Variance Decomposition analysis. The 
estimation of a Vector Auto-regression, VAR model, introduces by Sims (1980), requires two 
steps. First, a vector of variables dated at time t is regressed on several lags of itself. The 
residuals from these regressions are interpreted as innovations which show the new information 
about the variables that became available during period t. In the second step of estimation, these 
innovations are regressed on themselves, using one of several statistical procedures. The second-
stage regressions are often given a structural or behavioral interpretation. Therefore, the residuals 
from the second-stage regressions are often viewed as structural shocks. 
Yt = AYt-1 + … + A’Yt-k + et  (3)   
where k is the number of lags that is considered in the system Yt, Yt-1,…,Yt-k equals to the 1 x p 
vector of variables and A,…,A' equal to the p x p matrices of coefficients to be estimated. Also et 
is an 1 x p vector of innovations that may be contemporaneously correlated but are uncorrelated 
with their own lagged values and uncorrelated with all of the right-hand side variables.  
B.1. Unit Root Test 
For the co-integration methodology, at least two of the series should be non-stationary 
process that contains a single unit root. If Yt ~ I(1), then Zt = Yt – Yt-1 is stationary. We used 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on all of the variables for each country separately. We took first 
differences of all the variables that are non-stationary to make them stationary. We also used 
Akaike and Schwarz criterions to determine the lag lengths for each country. Estimating the six 
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dimensional VAR at the individual country level can suffer from too few degrees of freedom 
especially if there is missing data which is very common for macro variables. We had to drop 
some of the variables in some countries to get around this problem, especially the variables that 
have significant missing quarterly data. 
B.2. Granger Causality Test 
In a regression analysis, we look at the dependence of one variable on other variables, but 
it does not necessarily show the causation. In other words, the existence of a relationship 
between variables does not prove causality or the direction of the influence. 
Granger (1969) developed a test approach to prove that a time series X contribute to the 
prediction of another series, Y. In this section the relationship among real estate price index 
returns, GDP, inflation, money market rate, private credit and money supply are investigated 
using Granger Causality tests.  
 Table 5 displays the results from the Granger causality tests for each country, which 
reveals strong evidence of multi-directional causality between house prices, GDP, CPI, interest 
rates, money, and credit. In Hong Kong, Lithuania, Mexico and Poland, for example, the 
relationship between house prices and GDP is in both directions; GDP has a significant effect on 
the future house prices and house prices also have significant effect on the future GDP. This 
multi-directional relationship also exists between CPI and house prices in Hong Kong and 
Lithuania. There is also a multidirectional link between MMR and house prices in Czech 
Republic, South Africa and South Korea. Finally in Czech Republic the direction of relationship 
between private credit and house prices is both ways.   
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Table 5 
Granger Causality Test 
 
 
This table shows the direction of granger causality tests conducted in each country. ∆REI is the growth of the real estate price 
index; ∆GDP is the growth of GDP; MMR is the level of Money Market Rate; ∆CPI is the growth of Consumer Price Index, ∆D 
is the log of private credit, and ∆M3 is the log of money supply. P values are in parenthesis. 
   
∆GDP → ∆REI ∆REI → ∆GDP ∆GDP ↔ ∆REI 
Hong Kong (0.09) Bulgaria(0.01) Hong Kong 
Lithuania (0.01) Estonia (0.04) Lithuania 
Mexico (0.02) Hong Kong (0.01) Mexico 
Poland (0.08) Lithuania (0.01) Poland 
  Mexico (0.07)   
  Poland (0.01)   
  Russia (0.01)   
  Slovak Republic (0.01)   
 South Africa (0.01)  
  Turkey (0.01)   
∆CPI → ∆REI ∆REI → ∆CPI ∆CPI ↔ ∆REI 
Hong Kong (0.09) Hong Kong (0.01) Hong Kong  
Hungary (0.04) Indonesia (0.03) Lithuania 
Latvia (0.04) Lithuania (0.01)   
Lithuania (0.09) Slovak Republic (0.01)    
Mexico (0.02) South Korea (0.01)   
 Thailand (0.05)  
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
 
MMR → ∆REI ∆REI → MMR MMR ↔ ∆REI 
Czech Republic (0.09) Bulgaria (0.01) Czech Republic 
Estonia (0.09) Czech Republic (0.09) South Africa 
Israel (0.01) Hungary (0.04) South Korea 
South Africa (0.02) South Africa (0.01)   
South Korea (0.02) South Korea (0.02)   
  Turkey (0.04)   
∆M3 → ∆REI ∆REI → ∆M3 ∆M3 ↔ ∆REI 
Hong Kong (0.01) Czech Republic (0.01)  
 Malaysia (0.01)  
∆D → ∆REI ∆REI → ∆D ∆D ↔ ∆REI 
Czech Republic (0.01) Bulgaria (0.01) Czech Republic 
Indonesia (0.07) Czech Republic (0.03)   
 Hong Kong (0.04)  
 Lithuania (0.02)  
 Russia (0.04)  
 
It is also interesting to see that in almost every country, house prices significantly affect 
the future broad money, private credit and macro variables. This has an important implication for 
the policy makers in these countries as well as the potential investors to those countries.  Central 
banks do not necessarily implement policies to influence the future house prices, however our 
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results show that their policies can actually influence future house prices as well as the house 
prices strongly influence future broad money and private credit growth levels.    
B.3. Variance Decomposition 
In order to decompose the variance of each element of Yt in equation 3 into components 
due to each of the elements of the error term and to do so for various horizons, we conduct 
variance decomposition analysis. In this analysis we are trying to see how much of the variance 
of each element of Yt is due to the first error term and how much due to the second error term 
and so on. 
Our findings show an interesting picture for 19 emerging markets. Table 6 presents that 
the forecast errors of real estate price index returns are mainly attributable to their own 
innovations in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and South Africa in the 
following quarter. However, in Israel, only 33% is attributable to its own innovation whereas 
38% of the forecast error variance is explained by the innovations in CPI. In Estonia, Indonesia, 
Israel, Poland and Thailand less than 60% of the forecast errors are explained by their own 
innovations. Interestingly in Poland, innovations in CPI explain more than 46% of the forecast 
error variance to real estate price index returns. When we look at the second quarter horizon in 
table 6, also in Hong Kong, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey less than 60% of 
the forecast errors are explained by their own innovations. In almost every country we 
investigated, forecast errors to GDP, CPI, and money market rate play an important role in 
explaining innovations to the real estate price index returns.  
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Table 6 
Variance Decompositions 
This table shows the variance decomposition of real estate index growth in each country. REI is the growth of the real estate price 
index; GDP is the growth of GDP; MMR is the level of Money Market Rate; CPI is the growth of Consumer Price Index, D is the 
log of private credit, and M3 is the log of money supply. 
 
Period S.E. REI GDP MMR CPI D M3 
Bulgaria               
1 0.024157 100 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0.031711 81.0747 5.530402 6.061027 2.8238 4.50706 0.003009 
3 0.050675 77.97421 2.21586 16.83344 1.196401 1.778603 0.001487 
Czech Republic             
1 0.022201 100 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0.047523 93.13504 5.120865 0.066697 0.051782 1.552998 0.072618 
3 0.069225 78.24086 16.86071 0.053422 0.535702 4.23035 0.078966 
Estonia               
1 0.063735 58.78516 12.78755 28.14462 0.282668 0 0 
2 0.072426 45.53605 13.55422 34.58357 2.245882 0.031937 4.048342 
3 0.078737 39.14124 14.80916 33.80846 8.379692 0.366971 3.49448 
Hong Kong             
1 0.030106 74.99744 0.032971 11.88576 13.08383 0 0 
2 0.047896 55.13629 0.039506 19.81967 16.62758 4.372861 4.004098 
3 0.058281 43.70027 4.087707 23.19794 13.441 8.984462 6.588625 
Hungary               
1 0.017843 68.89523 2.423627 9.406063 19.27508 0 0 
2 0.018313 68.53662 2.482223 9.586204 18.3672 0.944833 0.082918 
3 0.018922 67.36271 3.044674 10.54692 17.83996 0.890909 0.31482 
Indonesia             
1 0.006904 39.00586 2.743775 7.785134 50.46524 0 0 
2 0.008069 30.1889 4.633825 5.815601 53.88642 5.466183 0.009081 
3 0.009158 23.55779 5.625276 14.42514 42.0328 14.18964 0.169355 
Israel               
1 0.014088 33.45416 9.106639 19.20721 38.23199 0 0 
2 0.016441 31.44371 11.93171 23.14612 31.18132 1.155003 1.142133 
3 0.018134 28.46376 14.22682 25.15489 27.11396 4.055117 0.985443 
Latvia               
1 0.102881 84.92258 12.07714 0.173257 2.827026 0 0 
2 0.105802 80.32982 11.71405 0.257026 7.699099 0 0 
3 0.106228 79.75319 11.73884 0.404214 8.103748 0 0 
Lithuania               
1 0.077673 71.85774 11.79486 0.394036 15.95337 0 0 
2 0.085396 59.73515 14.2033 0.704092 21.855 3.502454 0 
3 0.098347 51.58357 19.48563 7.959546 18.30758 2.663678 0 
58 
 
Table 6 (Continued) 
Period S.E. REI GDP MMR CPI D M3 
Malaysia               
1 0.035419 62.15115 24.48083 4.723128 8.644898 0 0 
2 0.044953 47.3974 37.29059 3.076149 12.11371 0 0.122148 
3 0.045099 47.09465 37.06453 3.121785 12.10755 0 0.61148 
Mexico               
1 0.009546 70.06695 0.004049 28.69054 1.238463 0 0 
2 0.01064 56.39961 7.084196 24.06984 10.19012 0 2.25623 
3 0.011372 51.64943 8.238863 24.71749 13.01386 0 2.380353 
Poland               
1 0.040745 21.6541 4.496019 27.24993 46.59995 0 0 
2 0.048746 24.75313 9.648047 28.18578 37.32417 0 0.088874 
3 0.060885 28.26724 8.110692 28.71206 32.15057 0 2.759436 
Russia               
1 0.037977 70.56521 18.56186 0.485193 10.38773 0 0 
2 0.043642 53.50575 16.19698 0.778594 25.58018 0.951301 2.987207 
3 0.047568 51.42839 14.07409 0.907194 21.53531 0.871043 11.18397 
Slovak Republic             
1 0.018012 100 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0.025347 99.76028 0.061759 0 0.177958 0 0 
3 0.034925 98.68466 0.204 0 1.111337 0 0 
Slovenia               
1 0.032443 100 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0.036588 96.74549 1.225553 0 0.116883 0 1.912072 
3 0.037587 94.26179 3.09955 0 0.141117 0 2.497541 
South Africa             
1 0.012137 99.64917 0.17224 0.101014 0.077571 0 0 
2 0.017433 93.58635 0.125583 3.793401 0.13879 1.380478 0.975399 
3 0.020111 86.71716 0.576669 7.915657 0.37984 2.996521 1.414152 
South Korea             
1 0.013546 85.33999 10.33327 0.045611 4.281133 0 0 
2 0.017821 65.14771 22.9192 7.732547 3.763197 0.126361 0.310983 
3 0.022263 47.89443 24.49571 17.4917 4.504618 5.40568 0.207866 
Thailand               
1 0.009175 14.88978 0.444163 19.9962 64.66986 0 0 
2 0.011393 11.03682 32.17626 14.41466 42.37226 0 0 
3 0.011833 11.06525 30.71152 13.85177 44.37147 0 0 
Turkey               
1 0.013866 84.12949 0.001894 6.342265 9.526354 0 0 
2 0.0273 54.16049 1.609169 4.251012 39.63942 0 0.339912 
3 0.034881 41.07273 1.133549 5.608226 51.90887 0 0.276629 
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V. Conclusion 
Real estate is undoubtedly one of the most important components of a national economy. 
This is also true for emerging countries. However, there is not enough empirical evidence 
regarding their interaction with money, private credit and macro economy. The main objectives 
of central banks are not necessarily in line with the goals of asset prices, particularly house 
prices; however house price changes can have important implications for economic activity and 
inflation. The consequences of substantial changes in house prices should also be watched 
carefully by central banks and other government agencies that regulate financial institutions for 
the purpose of financial stability. 2008 crises showed that the real estate prices have important 
effects on the overall economy. Emerging markets have been relatively less affected by this 
crises compared to the developed markets. 
Using the fixed effects panel data approach, this paper analyzes the variation in 19 
emerging markets real estate index returns. Our results show that money market rate, growth in 
GDP and CPI as well as log of private credit (D) and money supply (M3) have significant 
predictive power on growth in real estate price indices a quarter ahead. There is a strong negative 
correlation between the growth in real estate price indices and the lagged money market rates 
and private credit. There is a strong positive correlation between the growth in real estate price 
indices and the lagged growth in GDP, CPI and log of M3. When we look at different regions, 
we show that in Eastern Europe only GDP has a predictive power whereas in Asia MMR, D as 
well as M3 have statistically significant predictive power. 
Granger causality tests for each country reveals strong evidence of multi-directional link 
between house prices, GDP, CPI, interest rates, money, and credit. House prices significantly 
affect the future broad money, private credit and macro variables. When we look at the variance 
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decomposition, in almost every country we investigated, forecast errors to GDP, CPI and money 
market rate play an important role in explaining innovations to the real estate price index returns.  
Findings of this study may have important implications over the macro and monetary 
policies of the emerging markets. There has been a dramatic increase in REIT funds in the last 
decade. Emerging markets REIT funds also have become important tool in investments. Since 
the underlying asset of REITs are the real estate prices, finding variables that have important 
implications in a lead-lag relationship can also have important implication on these funds. 
Empirical findings of this paper do not necessarily support this analysis therefore a future 
research on the variables we investigated and REITs can present important implications for 
investors on more liquid assets like REITs.  
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Appendix A  
Definition of Ratios   
     
Measures Ratios Definition 
Liquidity analysis Current ratio Current assets/current liabilities 
  Quick ratio Quick assets/current liabilities 
  Net working capital ratio Current assets-Current liabilities / Total Assets 
     
Activity analysis Asset turnover ratio Sales/Average total assets 
  Accounts receivable 
turnover ratio 
Sales/Average accounts receivable 
  Inventory turnover ratio Cost of goods sold/Average inventories 
     
Management 
efficiency 
Cost-to-income Operating expenses/operating income 
  Expense-to-assets Operating expenses/average assets 
     
Earnings ability Gross profit margin Net profit/Revenue 
  Return on asset (ROA) Net profit before interest and tax/average 
shareholders equity 
  Return on equity (ROE) Net profit after tax/average shareholders equity 
     
Labor Growth in staff levels % change in the number of employees 
  Employee productivity Revenue/number of employees 
  Over employment proxy Total assets/number of employees 
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Appendix B 
Monthly Data Starting Date Ending Date 
HONG KONG SAR Jan-93 May-12 
ISRAEL Jan-01 Apr-12 
KOREA Jan-86 Jun-12 
THAILAND Mar-08 May-12 
SOUTH AFRICA Jan-66 Jun-12 
TURKEY Jun-07 Jun-12 
Quarterly Data Starting Date Ending Date 
BULGARIA 1997Q1 2012Q2 
CZECH REPUBLIC 2004Q1 2010Q4 
ESTONIA 2003Q3 2012Q1 
HUNGARY 2001Q4 2012Q2 
INDONESIA 2002Q1 2012Q2 
LITHUANIA 1998Q4 2012Q1 
LATVIA 2006Q1 2012Q1 
MEXICO 2005Q1 2012Q1 
MALAYSIA 2005Q1 2012Q1 
POLAND (5 MISSING OBSERVATIONS) 2002Q4 2012Q1 
ROMANIA 2009Q1 2012Q1 
RUSSIA 2001Q1 2012Q1 
SLOVENIA 2007Q1 2012Q1 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 2005Q1 2012Q1 
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